Insecurity in Nigeria: A State-by-State Breakdown

The National Security Picture

Nigeria faces one of the most complex security environments in sub-Saharan Africa. With a population exceeding 220 million people spread across 36 states and the Federal Capital Territory, the country contends with multiple, overlapping forms of violence that vary dramatically by region. Understanding insecurity in Nigeria requires moving beyond aggregate statistics to examine how each geopolitical zone experiences violence differently — from the desert fringes of the Sahel to the mangrove swamps of the Niger Delta.

The picture is stark: no region of Nigeria is entirely free from security threats, but the nature, intensity, and drivers of violence differ profoundly. In the northern half of the country, armed non-state actors have established territorial control in rural areas, while the south grapples with separatist agitation, organized criminal networks, and environmental crimes tied to the oil industry.

Between 2020 and 2025, Nigeria recorded over 25,000 fatalities from violent incidents according to data compiled from the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) and local security reports. However, these numbers only tell part of the story. The economic cost of insecurity — in terms of disrupted agriculture, destroyed infrastructure, internal displacement, and lost investment — runs into trillions of naira annually. The World Bank estimates that conflict and violence have reduced Nigeria's GDP by approximately 3 percentage points per year.

The major categories of insecurity affecting Nigeria include: armed banditry and kidnapping, primarily in the North-West and North-Central; Islamist insurgency by Boko Haram and its offshoot Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) in the North-East; farmer-herder conflicts driven by climate change and land pressure; separatist agitation and militancy in the South-East; sea piracy, oil theft, and cultism in the South-South; and urban criminality including kidnapping and organized cult violence in the South-West. Each of these categories demands distinct policy responses, yet they are increasingly interconnected as weapons, fighters, and tactics flow across regional boundaries.

The federal government's response has centered on military operations — Operation Hadin Kai in the North-East, Operation Safe Haven in the North-Central, and Operation Whirl Stroke in the North-West and North-Central — supplemented by community vigilante groups and, in some states, regional security outfits. Yet security sector reform remains incomplete, and trust between communities and security agencies is frayed in many areas by allegations of human rights abuses, extortion, and collusion with criminal elements.

North-West: The Banditry Belt

The North-West geopolitical zone — comprising Sokoto, Kebbi, Zamfara, Katsina, Kaduna, and Niger states — has become synonymous with armed banditry, a form of organized rural violence that has killed thousands and displaced hundreds of thousands since 2011. What began as localized cattle rustling and village raids has evolved into a sophisticated criminal economy involving kidnapping for ransom, illegal gold mining, drug trafficking, and the establishment of armed camps in forest reserves.

Zamfara State sits at the epicenter of the crisis. Once known for its vast gold deposits and agricultural potential, Zamfara has been devastated by bandit groups that operate from the Dansadau Forest, Kagara, and Birnin Magaji areas. The state has recorded the highest number of kidnapping incidents in Nigeria for three consecutive years. In 2024 alone, over 1,200 people were abducted in Zamfara, with ransom payments estimated in the billions of naira. The bandits, often organized along ethnic lines with Fulani herders forming the bulk of fighters, have attacked schools, markets, highways, and even military formations. The infamous abduction of 279 students from the Government Girls Secondary School in Jangebe in February 2021 drew global attention to the state's security collapse.

Katsina State, President Muhammadu Buhari's home state, has faced relentless attacks by bandits crossing over from Zamfara and from the Rugu Forest that straddles the border. The Batsari, Jibia, and Safana local government areas have been particularly hard hit, with entire communities abandoned as residents flee to the state capital or neighboring Niger Republic. The Kankara school abduction in December 2020, where 344 schoolboys were kidnapped by bandits, was a national embarrassment and highlighted the vulnerability of rural educational institutions.

Sokoto and Kebbi states, while less affected than Zamfara and Katsina, have experienced a sharp uptick in banditry since 2022. The Sokoto East senatorial district — particularly the Isa, Sabon Birni, and Goronyo local government areas — has seen repeated mass abductions and village burnings. In Sokoto, bandits have exploited the vast, ungoverned spaces of the Gudu and Tangaza areas bordering Niger Republic. Kebbi's Bagudo and Zuru emirates have similarly faced incursions, though the state's relative geographic isolation has provided some buffer.

The drivers of North-West banditry are multifaceted. Environmental degradation and desertification have reduced pasture availability, pushing herders into conflict with farming communities over land. The proliferation of small arms from Libya and across the Sahel has armed criminal groups. Illegal gold mining in Zamfara and parts of Niger State has funded arms purchases and created parallel economies outside state control. Weak local governance, corrupt traditional institutions, and the absence of effective rural policing have allowed bandit groups to establish what amounts to parallel administration in some areas, complete with taxation and territorial control.

Government responses have included military airstrikes on bandit camps, the proscription of bandit groups as terrorist organizations, and controversial amnesty and dialogue initiatives. Zamfara State's 2019 peace agreement with bandits collapsed within months, while Katsina's Ruga settlement scheme and livestock transformation plan have made limited progress. The effectiveness of federal military operations has been hampered by difficult terrain, intelligence gaps, and concerns that kinetic operations alone cannot address the socioeconomic roots of the crisis.

North-East: The Long Shadow of Insurgency

The North-East — Borno, Yobe, Adamawa, Bauchi, Gombe, and Taraba states — has borne the brunt of Islamist insurgency in Nigeria for over fifteen years. What began as the Boko Haram uprising in Maiduguri in 2009 has metastasized into a regional crisis involving multiple armed factions, regional military coalitions, and a humanitarian emergency affecting millions of people.

Borno State remains the most conflict-affected state in Nigeria. Boko Haram, formally Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad (JAS), and its breakaway faction ISWAP have waged a campaign of bombings, suicide attacks, abductions, and territorial occupation that has killed over 350,000 people directly and indirectly through famine and disease. At its peak in 2014-2015, the insurgents controlled territory the size of Belgium across Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa states, declaring a caliphate in Gwoza. The Chibok schoolgirl abduction in April 2014, where 276 girls were kidnapped, became a global symbol of the crisis.

While military operations under the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), comprising Nigeria, Niger, Chad, Cameroon, and Benin, have degraded Boko Haram's territorial control since 2015, the group and ISWAP continue to operate from strongholds in the Sambisa Forest, the Mandara Mountains, and the Lake Chad islands. ISWAP, which pledged allegiance to the Islamic State in 2016, has proven particularly resilient, adapting from holding territory to hit-and-run tactics, ambushes of military convoys, and attacks on soft targets. In 2023 and 2024, ISWAP carried out major attacks on the Kuje prison in Abuja and targeted military installations in Borno, demonstrating continued operational capacity.

Yobe State, Borno's western neighbor, has faced spillover violence concentrated in the northern senatorial districts of Geidam, Yunusari, and Gujba. The state capital, Damaturu, and the commercial hub of Potiskum have experienced periodic suicide bombings and armed attacks. Yobe's trauma was compounded by the 2013 Buni Yadi massacre, where 59 schoolboys were killed at the Federal Government College, and the 2014 abduction of over 100 girls from the Government Girls Secondary School in Dapchi — though most were later released.

Adamawa State has recovered somewhat from the 2014-2015 period when Boko Haram occupied Mubi and parts of the Madagali local government area. The state's southern and central regions have remained relatively stable, but the northern LGAs of Madagali, Michika, and Mubi North continue to face threats from insurgent cells operating across the Cameroon border. Adamawa also faces distinct security challenges from farmer-herder conflicts in the Numan and Lamurde areas, where Tiv farming communities and Fulani herders have clashed repeatedly.

The humanitarian consequences of the North-East crisis are staggering. The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) estimates that over 3 million people remain internally displaced in Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa, with the majority living in camps in Maiduguri, the world's largest internally displaced person settlement. Food insecurity affects millions, and the collapse of rural livelihoods has created a generation of unemployed youth vulnerable to recruitment by armed groups. The reconstruction and resettlement efforts led by the Presidential Committee on the North-East Initiative (PCNI) and the Borno State government have made progress in rebuilding infrastructure, but sustainable peace remains elusive as long as insurgents maintain safe havens in difficult terrain.

North-Central: The Middle Belt Tinderbox

The North-Central zone — Plateau, Benue, Nasarawa, Niger, Kogi, and Kwara states, plus the Federal Capital Territory — represents Nigeria's ethnic and religious fault line. Known as the Middle Belt, this region has experienced some of the country's most lethal communal violence, driven by competition over land, grazing routes, and political power between predominantly Christian farming communities and predominantly Muslim Fulani herders.

Plateau State, with its capital Jos, has been a byword for ethno-religious violence since the 2001 crisis that killed over 1,000 people. The state's complex demography — with indigenous Berom, Afizere, and Anaguta groups, Hausa-Fulani settlers, and other ethnic minorities — has produced a volatile mix of land disputes, indigene-settler tensions, and partisan political mobilization. Violent incidents in the Barkin Ladi, Riyom, and Bokkos local government areas have escalated dramatically since 2018, with coordinated attacks on farming villages by armed herders leaving hundreds dead. The Christmas Eve 2023 massacre in Bokkos and Barkin Ladi, where over 150 people were killed in simultaneous village attacks, was one of the deadliest incidents in the state's recent history.

Benue State, Nigeria's "Food Basket," has faced devastating herder-farmer violence, particularly in the Logo, Guma, and Agatu local government areas. The 2016 mass killing in Agatu, where over 300 people were killed in a week-long attack, prompted the state government to enact the Open Grazing Prohibition and Ranches Establishment Law in 2017 — one of Nigeria's first anti-open grazing laws. The law has been a lightning rod for national controversy, with herder groups arguing it discriminates against their livelihood and the federal government questioning its constitutionality. Governor Samuel Ortom became one of the most vocal critics of federal security policy, alleging complicity by security agencies in herder attacks.

Nasarawa State has experienced significant spillover from the Plateau and Benue crises, particularly in the Keana, Awe, and Toto local government areas that border Benue. The state's position as a transition zone between the Middle Belt and the North has made it vulnerable to both herder-farmer conflicts and the southward migration of banditry from Niger and Kaduna states. Nasarawa also faces security challenges from the activities of the Ombatse militia, an ethnic militia linked to the Eggon people, which has clashed with both security forces and herder groups.

The North-Central violence is distinct from the insurgency in the North-East and the banditry in the North-West in that it is deeply rooted in identity politics and resource competition rather than ideological or purely criminal motives. Climate change has accelerated the pressure on land, as desertification pushes herders further south into the Middle Belt, while population growth increases the demand for arable land. The failure of the federal government to implement comprehensive grazing reserves or ranching policies has left a policy vacuum that state-level anti-grazing laws have only partially filled. Operation Safe Haven, the military task force in Plateau and parts of Kaduna, has struggled to prevent attacks, often arriving after incidents have occurred and facing accusations of bias from all sides.

South-East: Separatism and the Gunmen Crisis

The South-East — Abia, Anambra, Ebonyi, Enugu, and Imo states — has been convulsed since 2021 by a security crisis that combines separatist agitation, armed militancy, and state security crackdowns. At the center of this crisis is the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB), a proscribed separatist group led by Nnamdi Kanu, and its armed wing, the Eastern Security Network (ESN). The emergence of "unknown gunmen" — armed groups carrying out attacks on security formations, government facilities, and perceived political enemies — has added a layer of lethal criminality that is not fully controlled by IPOB leadership.

Imo State has been the epicenter of South-East violence. The state has recorded the highest number of attacks on police stations, Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) offices, and military checkpoints. The April 2021 attack on the Nigerian Correctional Service and the Imo State Police Command headquarters in Owerri, which freed over 1,800 inmates, was a watershed moment. Governor Hope Uzodimma's government has faced accusations of stoking tensions through political maneuvering, including the controversial appointment of traditional rulers and the clash between the state government and the former Deputy Governor.

Anambra State, despite being the commercial heartland of the South-East with its sprawling Onitsha market and Nnewi industrial cluster, has not been immune. The November 2021 governorship election was preceded by a wave of violence, including the assassination of prominent figures and attacks on local government secretariats. The sit-at-home order, originally issued by IPOB to protest Nnamdi Kanu's detention, has been enforced every Monday with varying degrees of compliance and coercion across the state.

Enugu, Abia, and Ebonyi states have experienced lower levels of direct violence but suffer from the economic paralysis induced by the Monday sit-at-home order. In Enugu, the state capital has seen periodic attacks on security formations and government vehicles. Abia's commercial hub, Aba, once known as the "Japan of Africa" for its manufacturing sector, has been economically devastated by the weekly shutdowns. Ebonyi, under Governor Dave Umahi (now a federal minister), took a harder line against IPOB than some neighboring states, but still faces infiltration by armed groups.

The IPOB sit-at-home order has become one of the most economically destructive security measures in Nigeria. Every Monday, markets, banks, schools, and businesses across the five South-East states shut down, either voluntarily or under threat of violence. The order has cost the region billions of naira in lost productivity, forced businesses to relocate to Lagos and Abuja, and eroded the South-East's competitive position as Nigeria's manufacturing and trading hub. The enforcement of the order by IPOB/ESN and the violent response by "unknown gunmen" who attack those who defy it have created a climate of fear that suppresses normal economic and social activity.

The federal government's response has combined military operations — including the Operation Udoka joint security task force — with the controversial proscription of IPOB as a terrorist organization and the trial of Nnamdi Kanu on terrorism charges. Human rights organizations have documented extensive abuses by security forces in the South-East, including extrajudicial killings, arbitrary detention, and torture. The perception that the federal response is disproportionately harsh compared to treatment of armed groups in other regions has deepened alienation among many Igbo youth. Resolving the South-East crisis will require both security measures and political dialogue that addresses the historical grievances underlying Biafran separatism.

South-South: Oil, Piracy, and Cultism

The South-South zone — Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross River, Delta, Edo, and Rivers states — contains the Niger Delta, Nigeria's oil-producing heartland. The region's security challenges are shaped by the oil industry: environmental degradation, revenue disputes, and the proliferation of armed groups that have shifted from political militancy to organized criminality. While the peak of Niger Delta insurgency (2006-2009) has passed, the region remains volatile.

Rivers State, Nigeria's second-largest economy and oil production hub, faces a complex security environment dominated by cultism, political violence, and oil theft. Port Harcourt, the state capital, has one of Nigeria's highest urban violent crime rates, with cult groups like the Icelanders, Greenlanders, and Deygbam engaging in turf wars, assassinations, and kidnapping. The 2021 massacre in Oyigbo, where soldiers allegedly killed civilians during an operation against IPOB sympathizers, illustrated how national political conflicts intersect with local security dynamics. Oil bunkering — the illegal tapping of pipelines — remains rampant in the creeks of Bonny, Andoni, and Degema.

Delta State has transitioned from the militancy era of MEND (Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta) to a landscape of fragmented armed groups involved in oil theft, kidnapping, and illegal refining. The Warri axis experiences periodic cult clashes and political violence. Delta also faces environmental security risks from oil spills and gas flaring that have devastated fishing and farming communities. The proliferation of illegal refineries in the creeks — crude bush refineries that process stolen crude — poses both environmental and fire hazards, with periodic explosions killing scores.

Bayelsa State, the birthplace of Niger Delta militancy, remains heavily affected by sea piracy and oil theft in its coastal and riverine areas. The waterways around Brass, Nembe, and Southern Ijaw are among the most dangerous in Nigeria for commercial shipping and fishing vessels. Bayelsa also faces some of the country's most severe environmental degradation from decades of oil exploration, contributing to local grievances that armed groups exploit. The state recorded the highest poverty rate in Nigeria in recent national statistics, creating a pool of unemployed youth vulnerable to criminal recruitment.

Akwa Ibom, Cross River, and Edo states are relatively more stable but face localized security challenges. Akwa Ibom has experienced cult-related violence in Uyo and Eket. Cross River faces border security challenges with Cameroon, particularly in the Bakassi Peninsula area, as well as deforestation-driven conflicts in its forest reserves. Edo State has seen cultism in Benin City and rising human trafficking through the state as a departure point for illegal migration to Europe.

Sea piracy in the Gulf of Guinea, which includes Nigeria's territorial waters, had been the most severe globally by some measures, with the International Maritime Bureau recording hundreds of incidents annually. While piracy attacks have declined since 2021 due to the deployment of the Nigerian Navy's Deep Blue Project assets and regional maritime cooperation, oil theft — known locally as "bunkering" — remains an existential threat to Nigeria's economy. The Nigerian National Petroleum Company Limited (NNPCL) estimates that over 400,000 barrels of crude oil are stolen daily, representing billions of dollars in lost revenue annually. The illegal oil trade has become deeply entrenched, involving international criminal networks, corrupt security officials, and local politicians.

South-West: Kidnapping, Cultism, and Amotekun

The South-West — Lagos, Ogun, Oyo, Osun, Ondo, and Ekiti states — is Nigeria's most economically developed region, hosting the commercial capital Lagos and major industrial zones. Historically considered the most secure region, the South-West has experienced a marked deterioration in security since 2019, driven by kidnapping, armed robbery, farmer-herder conflicts, and cultism.

Oyo State has seen some of the most high-profile kidnapping incidents in the South-West, particularly along the Ibarapa and Oke-Ogun axes where herder-farmer tensions have escalated into lethal violence. The January 2021 killing of Sunday Adeyemo (popularly known as Sunday Igboho), a youth leader in Ibarapa who led resistance against herder violence, triggered a national crisis and intensified calls for regional self-protection. The Oyo State government's relationship with federal security agencies has been strained by allegations of federal bias in handling herder-farmer disputes.

Ondo State, under Governor Rotimi Akeredolu, became the first South-West state to issue an outright eviction order to herders in forest reserves in 2021, citing their use as hideouts by kidnappers. The state's Akoko, Owo, and Odigbo areas have recorded repeated kidnapping incidents on highways and in rural communities. Ondo also faces environmental security challenges from coastal erosion and conflicts between farming and fishing communities.

Ogun State, despite its proximity to Lagos and industrial development corridor, has experienced significant kidnapping along the Lagos-Ibadan expressway, the Abeokuta-Sagamu axis, and in the Yewa and Ijebu areas bordering Oyo and Lagos. The state's vast forest reserves — including the Omo Forest Reserve — have become hideouts for criminal gangs. The Lagos-Ibadan expressway, one of Nigeria's most important economic arteries, has seen repeated armed robberies and kidnappings that have traumatized travelers.

Ekiti and Osun states, though less populated, have not been spared. Ekiti recorded a series of high-profile kidnappings in 2022, including the abduction of traditional rulers and schoolchildren. Osun has faced cult-related violence in Osogbo and Ile-Ife, as well as farmer-herder clashes in its northern LGAs. Lagos State, while maintaining relatively better urban security through its extensive police presence and private security infrastructure, faces persistent challenges from armed robbery in traffic, "one-chance" robberies by fake commercial transporters, and cybercrime.

The South-West's response has been distinctive. In January 2020, the six governors launched Operation Amotekun (Yoruba for "leopard" or "one who knows the terrain"), a regional security network that operates as a state-backed vigilante force. Amotekun personnel, identifiable by their brown uniforms and distinctive berets, conduct patrols, gather intelligence, and support police operations. While Amotekun has been credited with arresting criminals and deterring some crimes, it operates in a legal gray area regarding firearms possession and arrest powers. The corps has faced accusations of profiling and extrajudicial violence, though on a smaller scale than federal security forces in other regions.

Measuring Security Perception

Incident counts and fatality figures from ACLED, the Council on Foreign Relations Nigeria Security Tracker, and UN OCHA show where violence happens. They do not show how safe people feel, and that matters just as much for governance, investment, and social cohesion. A state can record fewer attacks than its neighbour and still feel far less secure to the people who live there.

NigeriaPolls will publish question wording, field dates, response basis and sample size for every poll on security. Our nationwide random-digit-dial sampling frame covers over 11,000 Nigerian mobile numbers across all 36 states and the FCT, and a field partner network supports interviews where phone coverage is thin. The methodology page sets out how each poll is designed and checked.

Between polls, Nigeria Pulse tracks daily social conversation about security across Nigerian platforms. It is a conversation signal, not a poll, and it shows which states and incidents are driving public attention as they happen. Explore it on the Nigeria Pulse page.